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Abstract
We propose the maximin support method, a novel extension of
the D’Hondt apportionment method to approval-based multiwinner
elections. The maximin support method is based on maximizing the
support of the least supported elected candidate. It can be computed
efficiently and satisfies (adjusted versions of) the main properties of
1
the original D’Hondt method: house monotonicity, population mono-
tonicity, and proportional representation. We also establish a close
relationship between the maximin support method and Phragme´n’s
voting rules.
1 Introduction
Decision making based on the aggregation of possibly conflicting preferences
is a central problem in the field of social choice and has received a consid-
erable amount of attention from the artificial intelligence research commu-
nity [Conitzer, 2010; Brandt et al., 2016; Sandholm, 1999; Skowron et al.,
2015; Aziz et al., 2017; Elkind et al., 2017, 2011; Betzler et al., 2013]. A vot-
ing system takes as input the preferences of agents over a set of candidates,
and outputs one or several candidates as the collective choice. We study
multiwinner elections, where a subset of candidates of a fixed size needs to
be selected.
Multiwinner elections are often used in scenarios in which it is desirable
that the set of selected candidates represents different opinions or preferences
of the electorate. For instance, this is the case in parliamentary elections.
Representative multiwinner voting rules can also be applied in multi-
agent systems. For instance, consider the scenario in which a group of friends
usually goes to the cinema one or several times a week.1 Suppose that this
group of friends selects the set of movies that they are going to watch within a
certain time period (for instance, a month) using a multiwinner voting rule.2
In this scenario, if a minority of the members of the group have different
tastes from the majority, the minority may demand that a proportion of the
movies (proportional to the size of the minority) is selected from the movies
the minority likes.
Another, completely different, example is the selection of teachers for
a school.3 Suppose that a school has to hire a number of teachers. All the
classes in the school have the same size. The school director decides to run an
election to select the teachers, in which parents have to give their preferences
with respect to the candidates that have applied for the teacher positions.4
In this scenario, the ideal situation is to select and assign teachers in such
1A similar scenario has been discussed by Skowron et al. [2016] and by Elkind et al.
[2017].
2The use of multiwinner voting rules for preference aggregation in recommender systems
has also been proposed by Naamani-Dery et al. [2014].
3This example was suggested by Vincent Conitzer.
4We assume that the election is run among all the parents whose children belong to
the same grade.
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a way that all the parents like the teacher assigned to their childrens class.
Therefore, it does not matter if a teacher is only liked by a small minority of
the parents, as long as this minority consists of the parents of the children
that are assigned to this teacher.
Other examples of scenarios in which it is necessary to select a number
of candidates or choices that are representative of the preferences of a group
of agents have been discussed by Skowron et al. [2016], by Lu and Boutilier
[2011], and by Conitzer et al. [2017].
One of the basic characteristics of a multiwinner voting rule is the way
in which agents (voters) cast their votes. Two alternatives are commonly
used: 1) ranked ballots, in which agents have to provide a total order of the
candidates; and 2) approval ballots, in which agents simply approve as many
candidates as they like. One of the advantages of approval ballots compared
to ranked ballots is the simplicity of the ballots [Laslier and Sanver, 2010].
In this study, we propose an approval-based multiwinner voting rule that
can be used in scenarios in which it is necessary to select a representative set
of winners. Our voting rule, which we call the maximin support method, is an
extension of the well known D’Hondt method of apportionment (in the USA,
the latter is also known as Jefferson’s method) to approval-based multiwinner
elections. The maximin support method is inspired by the defining property
of the D’Hondt method: D’Hondt selects a set of winners that maximizes the
support of the least supported winner (a detailed explanation of this concept
will be provided later).
Together with seq-Phragme´n,5 the maximin support method is the first
polynomial-time computable methods that is known to satisfy propor-
tional justified representation (PJR), a representation axiom proposed by
Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. [2017]. Moreover, like the D’Hondt method, the
maximin support method also satisfies (adjusted versions of) house mono-
tonicity and population monotonicity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
a summary of the main notations and symbols used throughout the paper.
Section 3 reviews the D’Hondt method of apportionment, and Section 4 in-
troduces the concept of support distributions, on which the new method is
based. The maximin support method is defined in Section 5 and its axiomatic
properties are analyzed in Section 6. Section 7 compares the maximin sup-
port method with other extensions of the D’Hondt method, and Section 8
concludes.
5seq-Phragme´n was proposed by the Swedish mathematician Lars Edvard
Phragme´n [Phragme´n, 1894, 1895, 1896, 1899] in the 19th century. In simultaneous and
independent work to ours, Brill et al. [2017] proved that seq-Phragme´n satisfies PJR and
can be computed in polynomial time.
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2 Preliminaries
Let C be a finite set of candidates and N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of n voters.
Furthermore, k denotes the number of winners to be selected. We assume
1 ≤ k ≤ |C| and n ≥ 1.
For each i ∈ N , we let Ai ⊆ C denote the approval ballot of voter i. That
is, Ai is the subset of candidates that voter i approves of. A ballot profile
is a list A = (A1, . . . , An) of approval ballots, one for each voter i ∈ N .
An approval-based multiwinner election can thus be represented by a tuple
(N,C,A, k).
An (approval-based multiwinner) voting rule R is a function that maps
an election σ = (N,C,A, k) to a set R(σ) ⊆ C of |R(σ)| = k candidates,
interpreted as the winners of σ according to rule R. During the execution
of a voting rule, ties between candidates can occur. We assume that ties
are broken using a fixed priority ordering over the universe of all possible
candidates. For example, the priority ordering could be the lexicographic
order, and this is the one we use in our examples.
An important subdomain of approval-based multiwinner elections is de-
fined by party-list elections, where the set of candidates is partitioned into
parties and voters can vote for exactly one party. Formally, a party-list elec-
tion satisfies C = P1∪P2∪. . .∪Pp and every approval ballot Ai coincides with
one party list Pj. The ballot profile for a party-list election can be summa-
rized6 by a vote vector V = (v1, v2, . . . , vp), where vj is the number of votes for
party Pj (i.e., vj = |{i ∈ N : Ai = Pj}|). An apportionment method takes as
input a vote vector V = (v1, v2, . . . , vp) and a natural number k and outputs a
seat distribution x = (x1, . . . , xp) ∈ N
p
0 with
∑p
j=1 xi = k. The interpretation
is that party Pj is allocated xj seats. Apportionment methods have been
extensively studied in the literature [Balinski and Young, 1975; Pukelsheim,
2014]. Since the party-list setting is a special case of the general approval-
based multiwinner setting, every approval-based multiwinner rule induces an
apportionment method [Brill et al., 2018]. An approval-based multiwinner
rule is called an extension of an apportionment method if it induces it. In
this paper, we will introduce a novel extension of the apportionment method
due to D’Hondt.
6We assume that the voting rules that we are going to consider are anonymous.
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3 Review of the D’Hondt Apportionment
Method
The D’Hondt method (aka Jefferson method) is a particular example from a
family of apportionment methods known as divisor methods [Farrell, 2011;
Balinski and Young, 1975; Pukelsheim, 2014]. These methods assign seats to
parties based on a sequence of divisors (d1, d2, d3, . . .), and different divisor
methods differ in their choice of this sequence. Divisor methods can be
illustrated by constructing a table in which columns correspond to parties
and rows correspond to divisors. The entry in row i and column j is given
by vj/di, i.e., the number of votes of party Pj divided by the i-th divisor.
The divisor method then assigns the k seats to the parties corresponding to
the k highest quotients in this table.
The D’Hondt method is defined via the divisor sequence (d1, d2, d3, . . .) =
(1, 2, 3, . . . ). An example of the use of the D’Hondt method is shown in Ta-
ble 1, where five seats must be assigned to three parties: P1 (composed of
candidates a1, . . . , a5), P2 (composed of candidates b1, . . . , b5), and P3 (com-
posed of candidates c1, . . . , c5). As shown in Table 1, the D’Hondt method
assigns three seats to party P1, one to party P2, and one to party P3. Using
the lexicographic order to break ties among candidates of the same party,
the set of elected candidates is {a1, a2, a3, b1, c1}.
Parties P1 P2 P3
Votes (vj) 5 100 3 150 1 750
Divisors
d1 = 1 5 100.0 3 150.0 1 750.0
d2 = 2 2 550.0 1 575.0 875.0
d3 = 3 1 700.0 1 050.0 583.3
d4 = 4 1 275.0 787.5 437.5
d5 = 5 1 020.0 630.0 350.0
Seats (xj) 3 1 1
Table 1: Example of the use of the D’Hondt method. The k = 5 highest
quotients are marked in bold and correspond to the seat distribution (3, 1, 1).
An important proportionality axiom for apportionment methods is lower
quota, which requires that each party Pj is allocated at least ⌊k
vj
n
⌋ seats. It
is well known that the D’Hondt method is the only divisor method satisfying
lower quota [di Cortona et al., 1999; Balinski and Young, 1975]. Moreover,
the D’Hondt method satisfies house monotonicity and population monotonic-
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ity (see Section 6 for definitions of these properties).
4 A Formal Model for the Concept of Sup-
port
In this section, we formally introduce the notion of support, on which our
extension of the D’Hondt method will be based.
One way of viewing the D’Hondt apportionment method is to consider
that a vote received by a party is distributed among the elected candidates
from that party. For instance, in the example illustrated in Table 1, each of
the three elected candidates from party P1 is supported by 5100/3 = 1700
voters, the elected candidate from list party P2 is supported by 3150 vot-
ers, and the elected candidate from party P3 is supported by 1750 voters.
By definition, the D’Hondt method chooses a seat distribution that maxi-
mizes the support of the least supported candidate [di Cortona et al., 1999].
(For instance, assigning two seats to party P2 would mean that those two
candidates have a support of only 1575 voters.)
We now generalize this notion to the setting of approval-based multiwin-
ner elections, by distributing votes in the form of approval ballots among the
elected candidates. A natural condition is that the vote of a voter can only
be distributed among those candidates that are approved by that voter. In
general, there may be many different ways of distributing votes, leading to
different support values for candidates. We now present a formal model of
support without fixing any particular way of distributing the votes.
For an approval-based multiwinner election σ = (N,C,A, k) and a
nonempty subset D ⊆ C of candidates, we define the family Fσ,D of sup-
port distribution functions as the set of all functions that distribute sup-
port among the candidates in D. Formally, Fσ,D consists of all functions
f : (N ×D)→ [0, 1] satisfying
f(i, c) = 0 for all i ∈ N and c ∈ D \ Ai, and∑
c∈Ai∩D
f(i, c) = 1 for all i ∈ N with Ai ∩D 6= ∅.
For each voter i ∈ N , f(i, c) is the fraction of voter i’s vote that is
“assigned” to candidate c. Note that the definition requires that f(i, c) = 0
whenever c /∈ Ai. Thus, the vote of a voter is distributed only among those
candidates that are approved by that voter. Given a support distribution
function f ∈ Fσ,D and a candidate c ∈ D, we let suppf(c) denote the total
support received by c under f , i.e., suppf(c) =
∑
i∈N f(i, c).
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Approval ballot Votes
{c1, c2} 10 000
{c1, c3} 6 000
{c2} 4 000
{c3} 5 500
{c4} 9 500
{c5, c6, c7} 5 000
{c5} 3 000
Table 2: Ballot profile for election σ1
Example 1. Consider the election σ1 = (N,C,A, k) with k = 3 and C =
{c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c7}. There are n = 43000 voters and the ballot profile
is shown in Table 2. Consider the subset D = {c1, c3, c5} and let f be the
(unique) function in Fσ1,D with f(i, c1) = 0.4 for each voter i with Ai =
{c1, c3} (thus f(i, c3) = 0.6 for those voters). Thus, f assigns 2400 out of the
6000 {c1, c3}-votes to c1 and the remaining 3600 {c1, c3}-votes to c3, resulting
in the following support values.
suppf(c1) =
∑
i:Ai={c1,c2}
f(i, c1) +
∑
i:Ai={c1,c3}
f(i, c1) = 10 000 + 2 400 = 12 400
suppf(c3) =
∑
i:Ai={c1,c3}
f(i, c3) +
∑
i:Ai={c3}
f(i, c3) = 3 600 + 5 500 = 9 100
suppf(c5) =
∑
i:Ai={c5,c6,c7}
f(i, c5) +
∑
i:Ai={c5}
f(i, c5) = 5 000 + 3 000 = 8 000
5 The Maximin Support Method
We now propose an extension of the D’Hondt method to approval-based
multiwinner elections. It is based on the same principle as the D’Hondt
method, in that the support for the least supported elected candidates should
be as large as possible. We therefore refer to this novel method as maximin
support method (MMS ). The maximin support method chooses candidates
sequentially until the desired number k of candidates have been selected. In
every iteration, a candidate with the greatest support is chosen, under the
condition that only support distribution functions maximizing the support
for the least supported candidate are considered.
In order to formally define the method, we need the following notation.
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For an approval-based multiwinner election σ = (N,C,A, k) and a nonempty
candidate subset D ⊆ C, let maximin(σ,D) denote the maximal support for
the least supported candidate in D, where the maximum is taken over all
support distribution functions in Fσ,D. Formally,
maximin(σ,D) = max
f∈Fσ,D
min
c∈D
suppf(c).
Furthermore, we let Foptσ,D denote the nonempty
7 set of support distribu-
tion functions that maximize the support for the least supported candidate
in D for election σ, i.e.,
Foptσ,D = {f ∈ Fσ,D : ∀c ∈ D, suppf(c) ≥ maximin(σ,D)}.
Functions in Foptσ,D are called optimal support distribution functions.
We are now ready to present the maximin support method. Given an
approval-based multiwinner election σ, the set W = MMS (σ) is determined
by starting with W = ∅ and iteratively adding candidates until |W | = k. In
each iteration, we add to W the unelected candidate receiving the greatest
support, under the condition that only optimal support distributions func-
tions are considered.8 More precisely, for each candidate c ∈ C \ W , we
compute an optimal support distribution function fc for the set W ∪{c} and
determine the total support suppfc(c) that c receives under fc. The candi-
date maximizing this value is then added to W . The procedure is formally
described in Algorithm 1.
Since the set Fopt
σ,W∪{c} of optimal support distribution functions may con-
tain more than one function, the value of sc = suppfc(c) could potentially
depend on the choice of fc ∈ F
opt
σ,W∪{c}. The following result implies that this
is not the case.
Theorem 1. Let σ = (N,C,A, k) be an approval-based multiwinner election.
The following holds for each j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}.
Let W j denote the set of the first j candidates chosen by the maximin
support method when applied to σ. Then, for each candidate c ∈ C \W j and
for each optimal support distribution function fc ∈ F
opt
σ,(W j∪{c})
,
suppfc(c) = maximin(σ,W
j ∪ {c}).
7Since Fσ,D may be an infinite set, we need to make sure that the function
minc∈D suppf (c) attains a maximum over this set. We will see in the proof of Theo-
rem 2 that the corresponding optimization problem can be formulated as a feasible and
bounded linear program. It follows that Foptσ,D 6= ∅ and that maxf∈Fσ,D minc∈D suppf (c)
indeed exists.
8Restricting attention to optimal support distribution functions ensures that support
for previously elected candidates is not ignored when searching for new support distribution
function; see also Theorem 1.
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Algorithm 1: Maximin Support Method (MMS )
Data: approval-based multiwinner election σ = (N,C,A, k)
Result: subset W ⊆ C of candidates with |W | = k
1 begin
2 W = ∅
3 for j=1 to k do
4 foreach c ∈ C \W do
5 compute fc ∈ F
opt
σ,W∪{c}
6 sc = suppfc(c)
7 end
8 w = arg max
c∈C\W
sc
9 W = W ∪ {w}
10 end
11 return W
12 end
Theorem 1, whose proof can be found in A, states that in every iteration
the candidate c added to W is among the least supported candidates under
every optimal support distribution function. The support of this candidate
thus equals maximin(σ,W ∪{c}), which (by definition) is independent of the
particular fc ∈ F
opt
σ,W∪{c} that was chosen in line 6 of the algorithm.
This result gives rise to an interesting alternative formulation of the max-
imin support method. In this equivalent formulation, there is no need to
choose an optimal support distribution function from Fopt
σ,W∪{c}; rather, sc is
directly defined as maximin(σ,W ∪ {c}). A natural interpretation of this
definition is that the value sc measures the effect that the addition of a po-
tential candidate would have on the maximal support for the least supported
candidate.
The next theorem establishes that the maximin support method can be
computed efficiently.
Theorem 2. The maximin support method can be computed in polynomial
time.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that, for any subset D ⊆ C of candidates, an
optimal support distribution function f ∈ Foptσ,D can be computed in polyno-
mial time. For a given approval-based multiwinner election σ = (N,C,A, k)
and a D ⊆ C, consider the following linear program, containing a variable
f(i, c) for each i ∈ N and c ∈ Ai ∩D, and an additional variable s.
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maximize s
subject to
∑
i∈N :c∈Ai∩D
f(i, c) ≥ s, for all c ∈ D
∑
c∈Ai∩D
f(i, c) = 1, for all i ∈ N with Ai ∩D 6= ∅
f(i, c) ≥ 0, for all i ∈ N and c ∈ D
The first set of constraints require that the support for the least supported
candidate in D is at least s, while the remaining constraints ensure that the
variables f(i, c) encode a valid support distribution function.9 Therefore,
optimal solutions of this linear program correspond to optimal support dis-
tribution functions. Since linear programming problems can be solved in
polynomial time [Khachian, 1979], this concludes the proof.
We conclude this section by illustrating the maximin support method
with an example.
Example 2. Consider again the election σ1 from Example 1. In the first
step (j = 1), the value sc = maximin(σ1, {c}) equals the approval score of
candidate c, i.e., sc = |{i ∈ N : c ∈ Ai}| for all c ∈ C. Therefore, the
approval winner c1 (with sc1 = 16000) is chosen. The corresponding support
distribution function f satisfies f(i, c1) = 1 for all i ∈ N with c1 ∈ Ai.
In the second step (j = 2), we have W = {c1} and we need to compute
the value sx = maximin(σ1, {c1, x}) for every x ∈ C \ {c1}. For example, for
candidate c2 we get sc2 = maximin(σ1, {c1, c2}) = 10000; the corresponding
support distribution function f assigns 4000 out of the 10000 {c1, c2}-votes
to c1 and the remaining 6000 to c2. A better value is achieved by candidate c3.
The support distribution realizing sc3 = maximin(σ1, {c1, c3}) = 10750 as-
signs all 10000 {c1, c2}-votes to c1, all 5500 {c3}-votes to c3, and divides the
6000 {c1, c3}-votes between c1 and c3 such that both candidates have a to-
tal support of 10750 each. Computing the other values, we get sc4 = 9500,
sc5 = 8000, and sc6 = sc7 = 5000. Therefore, c3 is selected as the second
candidate.
In the third step (j = 3), we have W = {c1, c3} and we need to compute
the value sx = maximin(σ1, {c1, c3, x}) for every x ∈ C \ {c1, c3}. It can
be checked that sc2 = 8500, sc4 = 9500, sc5 = 8000, and sc6 = sc7 = 5000.
Thus, candidate c4 is chosen. There are several support distribution functions
9Note that constraints of the form f(i, c) ≤ 1 are not necessary because each variable
f(i, c) is non-negative and appears in a constraint of the form
∑
c∈Ai∩D
f(i, c) = 1.
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f ∈ Fopt
σ1,{c1,c3,c4}
realizing sc4 = maximin(σ1, {c1, c3, c4}) = 9500; each of them
assigns all 9500 {c4}-votes to c4 and distributes the 2500 votes containing c1
or c3 in such a way that c1 and c3 have a total support of at least 9500 each.
In summary, we have MMS (σ1) = {c1, c3, c4}.
6 Axiomatic Properties of the Maximin Sup-
port Method
In this section, we show that the maximin support method is indeed an ex-
tension of the D’Hondt method, and that it satisfies (adjusted versions of)
several important properties that the latter satisfies. In particular, we we
show that the maximin support method satisfies house monotonicity, weak
support monotonicity (a variant of population monotonicity), and propor-
tional justified representation. The latter property generalizes the notion of
lower quota to approval-based multiwinner elections.
6.1 D’Hondt Extension
We first show that the maximin support method coincides with the D’Hondt
method in the party-list domain. Our approach is similar to that of
Brill et al. [2018].
Theorem 3. The maximin support method is an extension of the D’Hondt
method.
Proof. Consider a party-list election σ = (N,C,A, k) with C = P1 ∪ . . .∪Pp
and vote vector V = (v1, v2, . . . , vp) (i.e., vr = |{i ∈ N : Ai = Pr}|). Let W
j
be the set of the first j candidates chosen by MMS . Let c be a candidate
in C −W j and let Pr be the party to which c belongs. In Theorem 1 we
proved that c will always be in the set of the least supported candidates when
we maximize the support for the least supported candidate in W j ∪ {c}.
But c is approved only by the voters that approve all the candidates in
Pr, and no candidate in Pr is approved of by any other voter. This means
that maximizing the support of the least supported candidate in W j ∪ {c}
depends only on the number vr of voters approving Pr and on the number of
candidates of Pr that are in W
j ∪ {c}.
Therefore, the support for the least supported candidate is maximized
if the total support vr of party Pr is distributed uniformly among all the
candidates in Pr that are in W
j ∪ {c} (any other distribution of the votes
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to Pr would make one or several candidates in (W
j ∪ {c}) ∩ Pr receive less
support), and
maximin(σ,W j ∪ {c}) =
vr
|(W j ∪ {c}) ∩ Pr|
This is exactly the same calculation the D’Hondt method performs for se-
lecting candidates, so both methods must assign the same number of seats
to each party.
6.2 House Monotonicity
House monotonicity requires that all selected candidates are still selected
when the number k of winners is increased.
Definition 1. An approval-based multiwinner voting rule R is house mono-
tonic if, for any pair of elections σ = (N,C,A, k) and σ′ = (N,C,A, k + 1),
it holds that R(σ) ⊂ R(σ′).
Since the maximin support method selects winners iteratively, house
monotonicity is trivially satisfied.
Theorem 4. The maximin support method is house monotonic.
6.3 Support Monotonicity
The standard definition of population monotonicity requires that addi-
tional support for a candidate does not harm that candidate. For in-
stance, the definition of candidate monotonicity given by Elkind et al. [2017]
when restricted to approval-based multi-winner elections leads to this no-
tion of monotonicity. A natural extension of this idea has been proposed
by Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez and Fisteus [2017] by considering what happens when
the support of several of the winners is increased. A first version of the axiom
(referred by Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez and Fisteus as weak support monotonicity)
requires that, when the support of a subset of the winners is increased, at
least one of those candidates must remain in the winning set.
Definition 2. An approval-based multiwinner voting rule R satisfies weak
support monotonicity if the following statements hold for all approval-based
multiwinner elections σ = (N,C,A, k) and for all nonempty subsets G ⊆
R(σ) of winning candidates:
1. (weak support monotonicity without population increase) Let i ∈ N be a
voter with Ai∩G = ∅ and consider the election σ
′ = (N,C,A′, k), where
A′j = Aj for all j ∈ N \ {i} and A
′
i = Ai ∪G. Then, R(σ
′) ∩G 6= ∅.
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2. (weak support monotonicity with population increase) Consider the
election σ′′ = (N ∪{n+1}, C,A′′, k), where A′′j = Aj for all j ∈ N and
A′′n+1 = G. Then, R(σ
′′) ∩G 6= ∅.
We note that this definition reduces to the standard definition of popu-
lation monotonicity when |G| = 1, and thus, despite its name, weak support
monotonicity is slightly stronger than the standard version of population
monotonicity.
Theorem 5. The maximin support method is weak support monotonic.
Proof. First of all, we observe that for any nonempty candidate set X that
is disjoint from G, the maximum support of the least supported candidate
in X (when distributing the votes only between the candidates in X) is the
same for σ, σ′, and σ′′. This is because the changes made in σ′ and σ′′ do
not affect how the votes can be distributed between the candidates in X .
Let r be the MMS iteration in which the first candidate from G is elected
in election σ and let c∗ ∈ G be such candidate. For 0 ≤ j ≤ k, let W j, W jσ′ ,
and W jσ′′ be the first j candidates chosen by MMS for elections σ, σ
′, and σ′′.
(For j = 0, we have W 0 =W 0σ′ = W
0
σ′′ = ∅.)
If at least one candidate fromG is selected within the first (r−1) iterations
of the execution of MMS for election σ′ (respectively, for election σ′′), the
statement of the theorem holds. Therefore, we assume that in the first r− 1
iterations no candidate from G is selected for election σ′ (respectively, for
election σ′′). In this case, at each iteration the candidate added to the set
of winners will be the same for σ and σ′ (respectively, σ and σ′′) because
the computation of maximin is done over sets of candidates disjoint from G.
Consequently, W (r−1) = W
(r−1)
σ′ (respectively, W
(r−1) = W
(r−1)
σ′′ ).
We are going to prove that the candidate chosen at iteration r for elec-
tion σ′ (respectively, for election σ′′) belongs to G. First, we observe that
since W (r−1) ∩ G = ∅, for each candidate c ∈ C \ (W (r−1) ∪ G) the maxi-
mum support of the least supported candidate in W (r−1) ∪ {c} is the same
for elections σ, σ′, and σ′′. It is therefore sufficient to prove that the max-
imum support of the least supported candidate in W (r−1) ∪ {c∗} = W r for
election σ′ (respectively, for election σ′′) is greater than or equal to the maxi-
mum support of the least supported candidate in W r for election σ. Further,
it is enough to find a support distribution function g ∈ Fσ′,W r (respectively,
a support distribution function h ∈ Fσ′′,W r) such that for each candidate c in
W r the support of c under g (respectively, the support of c under h) is greater
than or equal to the maximum support of the least supported candidate in
W r for election σ.
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Consider any optimal support distribution function f ∈ Foptσ,W r . For elec-
tion σ′ we can define g as follows. If Ai∩W
r 6= ∅, then let g(j, c) = f(j, c) for
each voter j ∈ N and each candidate c ∈ W r. If voter i does not approve any
of the candidates in W r in election σ (that is, if Ai ∩W
r = ∅), then for each
candidate c ∈ W r we have f(i, c) = 0. In that case we define g(j, c) = f(j, c)
for each voter j ∈ N , j 6= i, and each candidate c ∈ W r, g(i, c∗) = 1, and
g(i, c) = 0 for each candidate c ∈ W (r−1).
For election σ′′, let h(j, c) = f(j, c) for each voter j ∈ N and each can-
didate c ∈ W r, h(n + 1, c∗) = 1, and h(n + 1, c) = 0 for each candidate
c ∈ W (r−1).
Clearly, each candidate in W r receives a support under g and h that
is greater than or equal to the support that the same candidate receives
under f . Moreover, since f ∈ Foptσ,W r , all candidates in W
r receive a support
under f that is greater than or equal to the support of the least supported
candidate in W r for election σ.
Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez and Fisteus [2017] also consider a stronger axiom
called strong support monotonicity (with and without population increase)
that requires that, if the support of a subset G of the winners is increased, all
candidates in G must remain in the set of winners. The following example
shows that MMS does not satisfy this stronger requirement.
Example 3. Consider the election σ2 = (N,C,A, k) with k = 6 and
C = {a, b, c1, . . . , c5}. There are 18 voters casting the following ballots:
13 voters approve of {c1, . . . , c5}, 2 voters approve of {a, b}, 2 voters ap-
prove of {a}, and 1 voter approves of {b}. For this election, we have
MMS (σ2) = {a, c1, . . . , c5} (candidate a is elected in the fourth iteration).
If a new voter enters the election and approves of precisely {a, c1, . . . , c5},
then the sets of winners outputted by MMS is {a, b, c1, c2, c3, c4} (candidate
a is now elected in the third iteration while candidate b is elected in the last
one). This example proves that MMS violates strong support monotonicity
with population increase.
To prove that MMS violates strong support monotonicity without popu-
lation increase, we modify σ2 by adding a new candidate d and a new voter
approving of {d}. Let σ3 denote this modified election. It is easy to check
that MMS (σ3) = MMS (σ2) = {a, c1, . . . , c5}. If the new voter changes his
approval set to {a, c1, . . . , c5, d}, then the set of MMS winners is again given
by {a, b, c1, c2, c3, c4}.
We stress that other axioms related to population monotonicity could be
defined in addition to the two cases that we are considering in this paper.
One example could be that one voter changes her vote and no longer approves
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of a certain candidate c that was in the set of winners and a new voter enters
the election and approves only candidate c.
6.4 Proportional Representation
Finally, we consider axiomatic properties concerning the proportional rep-
resentation of voter groups. In particular, we will consider two axioms
that have recently been proposed: proportional justified representation
(PJR) [Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017] and extended justified representation
(EJR) [Aziz et al., 2017]. Both PJR and EJR are generalizations of the lower
quota axiom (see Section 3) to the general approval-based multiwinner set-
ting: if a voting rule satisfies PJR or EJR, then its induced apportionment
method satisfies lower quota [Brill et al., 2018].
In order to define PJR and EJR, we need some terminology. Let σ =
(N,C,A, k) be an approval-based multiwinner election. Given a positive
integer ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we say that a subset N∗ ⊆ N of voters is ℓ-cohesive
if |N∗| ≥ ℓn
k
and |
⋂
i∈N∗ Ai| ≥ ℓ. A subset D ⊆ C of candidates provides
proportional justified representation for σ (σ-PJR) if for all ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}
and all ℓ-cohesive subsets N∗ ⊆ N , it holds that
|D ∩ (
⋃
i∈N∗
Ai)| ≥ ℓ. (1)
And D provides extended justified representation for σ (σ-EJR) if for all
ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k} and all ℓ-cohesive subsets N∗ ⊆ N ,
there exists a voter i ∈ N∗ with |Ai ∩D| ≥ ℓ. (2)
Definition 3. An approval-based multiwinner voting rule R satisfies pro-
portional justified representation (PJR) (respectively, extended justified rep-
resentation (EJR)) if R(σ) provides σ-PJR (respectively, σ-EJR) for every
approval-based multiwinner election σ.
Since (2) implies (1), every rule satisfying EJR also satisfies PJR.
Theorem 6. The maximin support method satisfies proportional justified
representation.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there exists an election
σ = (N,C,A, k) and an ℓ-cohesive group N∗ ⊆ N such that for the set
W = MMS (σ) of winners output by the maximin support method we have
|W ∩ (
⋃
i∈N∗ Ai)| < ℓ. Thus, there are x > k − ℓ candidates in W that
are not approved of by any voter in N∗, and therefore, the support of some
15
of these x candidates (and the maximum support of the least supported
candidate in W ) has to be strictly less than n
k
(to see why, observe that
|N |−|N∗|
x
≤
n−ℓn
k
x
= nk−ℓ
kx
< n k−ℓ
k(k−ℓ)
= n
k
).
By Theorem 1, at each iteration the candidate that is added to the set of
winners is one of the least supported when we maximize the support of the
least supported candidate in the current set of winners. Therefore, at the last
iterations of MMS for election σ the support of the candidate that we add
to the set of winners when we maximize the support of the least supported
candidate is strictly less than n
k
(this happens for sure at least in the last
iteration).
Let j be the first iteration of MMS for election σ such that the maximum
support of the least supported candidate in W is less than n
k
and let c be the
candidate elected in such iteration. Let c∗ be a candidate that is approved
of by all the voters in N∗ and that does not belong to W (such candidate
exists because |
⋂
i∈N∗ Ai| ≥ ℓ but |W ∩ (
⋃
i∈N∗ Ai)| < ℓ). Since all the voters
in N∗ approve c∗ and there are at most ℓ − 1 candidates in W that are
approved by some voters in N∗, if we add candidate c∗ to the set of winners
instead of candidate c at iteration j, the support of c∗ when we maximize
the support of the least supported candidate would be at least |N
∗|
ℓ
(observe
that if some of the candidates in W that are approved by some voters in
N∗ had a support greater than |N
∗|
ℓ
we could iteratively pick each of such
candidates and give the surplus coming from voters in N∗ to c∗). Observe
now that |N
∗|
ℓ
≥
ℓn
k
ℓ
= n
k
, and therefore candidate c∗ would be elected ahead
of candidate c at iteration j, a contradiction.
The following example shows that the maximin support method does not
satisfy the stronger axiom EJR.
Example 4. Consider election σ4 = (N,C,A, k) with k = 4 and C =
{a1, a2, a3, c1, c2, c3, c4}. There are 16 voters casting the following ballots:
5 voters approve of {a1, c1, c2, c3, c4}, 4 voters approve of {a2, c1, c2, c3, c4},
3 voters approve of {a3, c1, c2, c3, c4}, 2 voters approve of {a1}, one voter
approves of {a2}, and one voter approves of {a3}.
The set of winners according to the maximin support method is given by
MMS (σ4) = {c1, a1, a2, a3} (selected in this order). The 12 voters whose
approval set contains {c1, c2, c3, c4} form a 3-cohesive group, but none of
these voters approves at least 3 candidates in the set of winners. There-
fore, MMS (σ4) fails to provide σ4-EJR, which implies that MMS does not
satisfy EJR.
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7 Comparison With Other D’Hondt Exten-
sions
The maximin support method is not the only way to extend the D’Hondt
method to approval-based multiwinner elections. In this section we are go-
ing to compare the maximin support method with other extensions of the
D’Hondt method. In particular, we will consider two classes of rules, both
of which originated in Scandinavia in the 1890s. The first class of rules was
proposed by the Swedish mathematician Lars Edvard Phragme´n [Phragme´n,
1894, 1895, 1896, 1899] and the second class of rules was proposed by the
Danish polymath Thorvald N. Thiele [Thiele, 1895]. We briefly review some
axiomatic and computational properties of those rules and illustrate their
differences with the maximin support method. For an extensive treatment
of Phragme´n’s and Thiele’s rules and their properties, we refer to the survey
by Janson [2016].
7.1 Phragme´n’s Rules
Phragme´n’s methods can be described as load distribution methods. Every
selected candidate induces one unit of load, and this load needs to be dis-
tributed among the voters that approve of that candidate. For example, if
there are 6 voters approving candidate c and we decide to select this candi-
date for the committee, then one possible way of distributing the load would
be to give a load of 1
6
to each of those voters. However, it is not required
that the load is distributed evenly among the approvers: different approvers
of c could be assigned different (non-negative) loads, as long as the loads
associated with each selected candidate sum up to 1. The goal is to choose
a committee W such that the load distribution is as balanced as possible.
Different interpretations of balancedness lead to different optimization goals;
the most relevant variant minimizes the maximal load of a voter.
In particular, max-Phragme´n is the rule that returns winner sets cor-
responding to load distributions minimizing the maximal voter load. And
seq-Phragme´n is a sequential (greedy) version of max-Phragme´n; it selects
candidates iteratively, in each round adding a candidate to the committee
such that the new maximal voter load is as small as possible.
7.1.1 Load Distributions
Given an election σ = (N,C,A, k) and a subset D ⊆ C of candidates, a
load distribution for D given σ is a two-dimensional array ℓ = (ℓi,c)i∈N,c∈D
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satisfying
0 ≤ ℓi,c ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N and c ∈ D,
ℓi,c = 0 for all i ∈ N and c ∈ D \ Ai, and∑
i∈N
ℓi,c = 1 for all c ∈ D.
We let Lσ,D denote the set of all load distributions for D given σ. For a
load distribution ℓ ∈ L, the total load of voter i under ℓ, denoted ℓi, is given
by ℓi =
∑
c∈D ℓi,c. Note that
∑
i∈N ℓi = |D| for all ℓ ∈ Lσ,D.
Finally, a load distribution is called optimal for given σ and D if the
maximal total voter load maxi∈N ℓi is as small as possible. L
opt
σ,D denotes the
set of all optimal load distribution functions.
We are now going to establishing a close connection between load distri-
butions and support distribution functions.10
Lemma 1. Let σ = (N,C,A, k) be an approval-based multiwinner election
and D ⊆ C a subset of candidates. Then, the following statements hold.
1. For every support distribution function f ∈ Fσ,D, there is a load distri-
bution ℓf ∈ Lσ,D such that
max
i∈N
ℓfi ≤
1
minc∈D suppf(c)
.
2. For every load distribution ℓ ∈ Lσ,D, there is a support distribution
function f ℓ ∈ Fσ,D such that
min
c∈D
suppfℓ(c) ≥
1
maxi∈N ℓi
.
Proof. For a given a support distribution function f ∈ Fσ,D, define the load
distribution ℓf ∈ Lσ,D by setting ℓ
f
i,c =
f(i,c)
suppf (c)
for each i ∈ N and c ∈ D.11 It
follows that the total load of a voter is upper bounded by 1
suppf (c
∗)
, where c∗
is a candidate with minimal support (we recall that
∑
c f(i, c) = 1 for each
voter i such that Ai ∩D 6= ∅).
For a given load distribution ℓ ∈ Lσ,D, define a support distribution
function f ℓ ∈ Fσ,D by setting f
ℓ(i, c) =
ℓi,c
ℓi
for each voter i ∈ N such that
10Throughout this section we assume that each candidate in D is approved by some
voter in N ; otherwise, load distributions cannot be defined.
11If for some candidate c it is suppf (c) = 0 the first part of the lemma trivially holds.
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ℓi > 0. That is, the support for a candidate is proportional to the load
received from that candidate, scaled such that the total support by the voter
is 1. It follows that the minimal support of a candidate is lower bounded by
1
ℓi∗
, where i∗ is a voter with maximal load. To see this, let i∗ denote a voter
with maximal load and let c ∈ D. Then,
suppfℓ(c) =
∑
i∈N
f ℓ(i, c) ≥
∑
i∈N :ℓi>0
ℓi,c
ℓi
≥
1
ℓi∗
∑
i∈N
ℓi,c =
1
ℓi∗
.
7.1.2 Phragme´n’s Optimal Rule
Lemma 1 has particularly interesting implications for load distributions and
support distribution functions that are optimal: The construction used in
the proof of Lemma 1 establishes a one-to-one relationship between elements
of Loptσ,D and elements of F
opt
σ,D. Therefore, the objective of minimizing the
maximal voter load is equivalent to the objective of maximizing the minimal
support. As a consequence, max-Phragme´n (the method that globally mini-
mizes the maximal voter load) is identical to the rule that globally maximizes
the minimal support.12
Theorem 7. Let σ = (N,C,A, k) be an approval-based multiwinner election.
Then, max-Phragme´n(σ) = argmaxW⊆C,|W |=kmaximin(σ,W ).
Since it is NP-hard to compute winners under max-Phragme´n [Brill et al.,
2017], the same is true for finding a set of candidates maximizing the max-
imin support. Brill et al. [2017] proved that max-Phragme´n satisfies PJR
(when combined with an appropriate tie-breaking rule) but not EJR. With
respect to monotonicity axioms, Mora and Oliver [2015] proved that max-
Phragme´n fails house monotononicity and Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez and Fisteus
[2017] have recently extended previous results by Phragme´n [1896] show-
ing that max-Phragme´n satisfies weak support monotonicity but fails strong
support monotonicity.
7.1.3 Phragme´n’s Sequential Rule
There is also a close relationship between the maximin support method
(MMS ) and Phragme´n’s sequential rule (seq-Phragme´n). Both MMS and
seq-Phragme´n construct the set of winners by iteratively adding candidates:
12The latter method has been referred to as optimal open D’Hondt (OODH) in earlier
versions of this manuscript.
19
MMS chooses candidates such that the minimal support of the new set is
maximized; seq-Phragme´n chooses candidates such that the maximal voter
load incurred by the new set is minimized. However, there is a subtle differ-
ence between the two methods concerning the redistribution of support/load.
UnderMMS , support distributed to candidates in earlier rounds can be freely
redistributed when looking for maximin support distributions for the new set
of candidates. This is not the case for the loads under seq-Phragme´n, how-
ever: once a voter is assigned some load from some candidate, this load is
“frozen” and will always stay with the voter. As a consequence, the two
methods might give different results.
Example 5. Consider again the approval-based multiwinner election σ4 from
Example 4. We recall that MMS (σ4) = {c1, a1, a2, a3}. In contrast, it can be
easily shown that seq-Phragme´n selects (in this order) {c1, c2, c3, a1}.
It is straightforward to check that seq-Phragme´n can be computed in
polynomial time. With respect to the axiomatic properties considered
in this paper, seq-Phragme´n is indistinguishable from the maximin sup-
port method: seq-Phragme´n satisfies house monotonicity by definition; it
satisfies PJR but fails EJR [Brill et al., 2017]; and results by Phragme´n
[1896], Mora and Oliver [2015], and Janson [2016] imply that seq-Phragme´n
satisfies weak support monotonicity but violates strong support monotonic-
ity.
7.2 Thiele’s Rules
Thiele’s rules are based on a score optimization problem [Thiele, 1895]. For
a given approval-based multiwinner election σ = (N,C,A, k), the goal is
to find a winner set W with |W | = k maximizing s(W ) =
∑
i∈N s(i,W ),
where s(i,W ) is defined by s(i,W ) =
∑|Ai∩W |
j=1
1
j
. Thiele [1895] proved that
his methods are extensions of the D’Hondt method (see also [Janson, 2016;
Brill et al., 2018]).
Thiele’s optimal rule, often referred to as Proportional Approval Voting
(PAV) [Kilgour, 2010], outputs a set W maximizing s(W ). This rule sat-
isfies EJR (and thus PJR) [Aziz et al., 2017] and is NP-hard to compute
[Aziz et al., 2015; Skowron et al., 2016]. It was already known by Thiele
[1895] that PAV fails house monotonicity. Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez and Fisteus
[2017] proved that PAV satisfies strong support monotonicity with popula-
tion increase (in fact, PAV is the only rule that is known to satisfy this axiom
and EJR or PJR) but only weak support monotonicity without population
increase.
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Thiele’s sequential rule (sometimes referred to as Reweighted Approval
Voting (RAV), sequential PAV, or Thiele’s addition method), is a greedy
heuristic for the score optimization problem defined above. The rule starts
with W = ∅ and iteratively adds candidates c maximizing the score
s(W ∪ {c}). It is straightforward to show that Thiele’s sequential rule
can be computed in polynomial time. The rule satisfies house monotonicity
by definition. Furthermore, it satisfies weak support monotonicity but not
strong support monotonicity [Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez and Fisteus, 2017], and it
fails PJR [Aziz et al., 2017].13
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed the maximin support method, a novel exten-
sion of the D’Hondt method to approval-based multiwinner elections. The
principle on which this voting rule is based is that the support of the least
supported winner should be maximized.
We have established that the maximin support method can be computed
efficiently and satisfies a number of appealing axiomatic properties, including
house monotonicity, weak support monotonicity, and proportional justified
representation. We have also shown that the rule admits two equivalent for-
mulations: in each iteration, selecting the candidate with the highest support
(using an optimal support distribution function) is equivalent to selecting
the candidate that maximizes the support of the least supported candidate.
This can be seen as selecting, at the same time, the “best” candidate and
the “best” set of candidates (from those that can be obtained by adding a
new candidate to the set of previously chosen winners). We believe that this
is a nice feature of the maximin support method.
We have also established a close relationship between the maximin sup-
port method and Phragme´n’s rules. This novel connection allows us to for-
mulate Phragme´n’s optimal rule as a support maximization (rather than a
load minimization) problem, and to view the maximin support method as a
tractable approximation of Phragme´n’s (intractable) optimal rule. It would
be very interesting to further illuminate the differences between the maximin
support method and Phragme´n’s sequential rule.
Other possible lines of future work include axiomatic characterizations of
the maximin support method (and other approval-based multiwinner rules),
as well as the development of extensions to the ranked ballot setting.
13Thiele’s sequential method also violates the weaker property justified representa-
tion [Aziz et al., 2017; Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017].
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A Proof of Theorem 1
We employ linear programming duality theory (see, e.g., [Chva´tal, 1983]).
Let σ be an approval-based multiwinner election and D ⊆ C a nonempty
subset of candidates. We have seen in Section 5 that maximin(σ,D) can be
computed with the following linear program.
maximize s
subject to
∑
i∈N :c∈Ai∩D
f(i, c) ≥ s, for all c ∈ D (3)
∑
c∈Ai∩D
f(i, c) = 1, for all i ∈ N with Ai ∩D 6= ∅ (4)
f(i, c) ≥ 0, for all i ∈ N and c ∈ D
We now consider the dual of this linear program. For every inequality con-
straint of the form (3), there is an associated non-negative dual variable yc
(c ∈ D), and for every equality constraint of the form (4), there is an un-
restricted dual variable zi (i ∈ N and Ai ∩ D 6= ∅). The dual looks as
follows.
minimize
∑
i∈N :Ai∩D 6=∅
zi
subject to
∑
c∈D
yc = 1 (5)
zi ≥ yc, for all i ∈ N and c ∈ Ai ∩D (6)
yc ≥ 0, for all c ∈ D
Let (s∗, f ∗) be an optimal solution for the primal linear program and (y∗, z∗)
an optimal solution for the dual linear program. Then,
s∗ =
∑
i∈N :Ai∩D 6=∅
z∗i = maximin(σ,D).
Moreover, from complementary slackness we get that the implication
suppf∗(c) > s
∗ ⇒ y∗c = 0 (7)
holds for all candidates c ∈ D. That is, if the support of a candidate c under
an optimal support distribution function f ∗ exceeds maximin(σ,D), then the
dual variable yc (associated with the primal constraint
∑
i f(i, c) ≥ s) equals
zero in the optimal solution (y∗, z∗) for the dual.
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We first prove a lemma that relates maximin support values of different
sets. In particular, it states that candidates receiving more then the minimal
support (under an optimal support distribution function) can be removed
without affecting the maximin value of the set.
Lemma 2. Let σ = (N,C,A, k) be an approval-based multiwinner election,
D ⊆ C a nonempty subset of candidates, and f ∈ Foptσ,D an optimal support
distribution function. If there exists a candidate cˆ ∈ D such that suppf (cˆ) >
maximin(σ,D), then maximin(σ,D) = maximin(σ,D \ {cˆ}).
Proof. It is easy to verify that maximin(σ,D) ≤ maximin(σ,D \ {cˆ}). We
will now show that maximin(σ,D) ≥ maximin(σ,D \ {cˆ}) also holds.
Consider the primal and dual linear programs corresponding to the
computation of maximin(σ,D) together with optimal solutions (s∗, f ∗) and
(y∗, z∗), where f ∗ = f and s∗ = maximin(σ,D). Since suppf(c) >
maximin(σ,D) holds by assumption, (7) implies that y∗cˆ = 0. Furthermore,
if there exist voters i ∈ N with Ai ∩D = {cˆ}, then z
∗
i = 0 for all such voters
(because variable zi only appears in the single constraint zi ≥ ycˆ).
Now consider the dual linear program corresponding to the computation
of maximin(σ,D \ {cˆ}). This linear program has a variable yc for each c ∈
D\{cˆ} and a variable zi for each i ∈ N with Ai∩(D\{cˆ}) 6= ∅. We are going
to construct a feasible solution (yˆ, zˆ) for this linear program by restricting
(y∗, z∗) to the smaller domain.
For each c ∈ D \ {cˆ}, let yˆc = y
∗
c . Moreover, for each i ∈ N with
Ai ∩ (D \ {cˆ}) 6= ∅, let zˆi = z
∗
i . The solution (yˆ, zˆ) is feasible for the linear
program in question because y∗cˆ = 0 and thus
∑
c∈D\{cˆ}
yˆc =
∑
c∈D
y∗c = 1.
And the objective function value of the solution (yˆ, zˆ) is equal to that of the
solution (y∗, z∗) in the original dual because
∑
i∈N :
Ai∩(D\{cˆ})6=∅
zˆi =
∑
i∈N :
Ai∩(D\{cˆ})6=∅
z∗i =
∑
i∈N :
Ai∩(D\{cˆ})6=∅
z∗i +
∑
i∈N :
Ai∩D={cˆ}
z∗i =
∑
i∈N :
Ai∩D 6=∅
z∗i = s
∗.
It follows that the objective function value of the dual linear program
for D \ {cˆ} is less than or equal to the objective function value s∗ of the
dual linear program for D.14 In other words, maximin(σ,D \ {cˆ}) ≤ s∗ =
maximin(σ,D).
14Recall that the duals are minimization problems.
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We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Let σ = (N,C,A, k) be an approval-based multiwinner election.
The following holds for each j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}.
Let W j denote the set of the first j candidates chosen by the maximin
support method when applied to σ. Then, for each candidate c ∈ C \W j and
for each optimal support distribution function fc ∈ F
opt
σ,(W j∪{c}),
suppfc(c) = maximin(σ,W
j ∪ {c}).
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof is by induction on j. For j = 0, the state-
ment clearly holds because W 0 ∪ {c} = {c} and there is a unique op-
timal support distribution function fc ∈ F
opt
σ,{c} that furthermore satisfies
suppfc(c) = maximin(σ, {c}).
For the inductive step, let us assume that the statement holds for j = m.
We show that it also holds for j = m+ 1.
Suppose for contradiction that this is not the case. Then, there exist
a candidate c ∈ C − Wm+1 and an optimal support distribution function
fc ∈ F
opt
σ,Wm+1∪{c} such that
suppfc(c) > maximin(σ,W
m+1 ∪ {c}). (8)
By Lemma 2, this implies that
maximin(σ,Wm+1 ∪ {c}) = maximin(σ,Wm+1). (9)
Let cm+1 be the (m+1)st candidate chosen by MMS for election σ. Thus,
Wm+1 = Wm∪{cm+1}. Let g be a support distribution function onW
m∪{c}
such that
suppg(c
′) ≥ suppfc(c
′) for all c′ in Wm ∪ {c}. (10)
Such a function can easily be constructed by considering fc and redistributing
support that is assigned to candidate cm+1.
We now distinguish two cases: either the function g maximizes the sup-
port for the least supported candidate in Wm ∪ {c}, or it does not.
Case 1 g ∈ Fopt
σ,Wm∪{c}. In this case,
maximin(σ,Wm ∪ {c}) = min
c′∈Wm∪{c}
suppg(c
′), (11)
and thus, by the induction hypothesis,
maximin(σ,Wm ∪ {c}) = suppg(c). (12)
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By combining (8), (9), (10), and (12), we have
maximin(σ,Wm ∪ {c}) = suppg(c) ≥ suppfc(c)
> maximin(σ,Wm+1 ∪ {c})
= maximin(σ,Wm ∪ {cm+1}).
However, this is a contradiction because it implies that candidate c should
have been selected instead of cm+1 at iteration (m+ 1).
Case 2 g ∈ Fσ,Wm∪{c} \ F
opt
σ,Wm∪{c}. In this case,
maximin(σ,Wm ∪ {c}) > min
c′∈(Wm∪{c})
suppg(c
′). (13)
Furthermore, since fc ∈ F
opt
σ,Wm+1∪{c}, we have
min
c′∈(Wm+1∪{c})
suppfc(c
′) = maximin(σ,Wm+1 ∪ {c}). (14)
By combining (9), (10), (13) and (14), we have
maximin(σ,Wm ∪ {c}) > min
c′∈(Wm∪{c})
suppg(c
′) ≥ min
c′∈(Wm+1∪{c})
suppfc(c
′)
= maximin(σ,Wm+1 ∪ {c})
= maximin(σ,Wm ∪ {cm+1}).
Again, this is a contradiction because it implies that candidate c should
have been selected instead of cm+1 at iteration (m+ 1).
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